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The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Technology Trust
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Industry and government tried to use information technologies to
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but using the internet as a tool for
disease surveillance, public health messaging, and testing logistics turned
out to be a disappointment. Why weren’t these efforts more effective? This
Essay argues that industry and government efforts to leverage technology
were doomed to fail because tech platforms have failed over the past few
decades to make their tools trustworthy, and lawmakers have done little
to hold these companies accountable. People cannot trust the interfaces
they interact with, the devices they use, and the systems that power tech
companies’ services.
This Essay explores these pre-existing privacy ills that contributed to
these problems, including manipulative user interfaces, consent regimes
that burden people with all the risks of using technology, and devices that
collect far more data than they should. A pandemic response is only as
good as its adoption, but pre-existing privacy and technology concerns
make it difficult for people seeking lifelines to have confidence in the
technologies designed to protect them. We argue that a good way to help
close the technology trust gap is through relational duties of loyalty and
care, better frameworks regulating the design of information
technologies, and substantive rules limiting data collection and use
instead of procedural “consent and control” rules. We conclude that the
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pandemic could prove to be an opportunity to leverage motivated
lawmakers to improve our privacy frameworks and make information
technologies worthy of our trust.
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1506
II. DISAPPOINTING TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE PANDEMIC ..... 1508
A. Questionable Requests .................................................................... 1508
B. Broken Promises ................................................................................ 1510
C. Techno-Solutionism .......................................................................... 1513
III. A LACK OF TRUST IN TECHNOLOGIES ............................................................. 1515
A. Interfaces and Information ............................................................ 1516
B. Applications and Devices ................................................................ 1520
C. Systems and Intentions.................................................................... 1522
IV. CLOSING THE TRUST GAP .................................................................................. 1526
A. Relational Duties of Trust............................................................... 1526
B. Consent, Liability, and Design Frameworks ........................... 1527
C. Substantive Rules Limiting Data Collection and Use ........... 1530
V. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 1532
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the factors that has made responding to the COVID-19
pandemic so difficult and frustrating is that industry’s current strategy
of building an app for every problem was ineffective. Silicon Valley
created the world’s most powerful surveillance network and tools to
influence populations. But few people wanted to use proximity
notification apps, and social media was a swamp of disinformation
about the virus, treatments, and public health advice. Modern
technology allows us to monitor the coronavirus’s spread in detail and
facilitate public health interventions—but only if people trust the tools
they are being asked to use and the companies and governments they
are dealing with. There is plenty to critique about the entire
institutional and individual response to the pandemic, but the seeds of
our collective inability to effectively utilize information technologies as
part of our pandemic response were sown long ago. They just bloomed
during the pandemic.
The rapid and sometimes heavy-handed implementation of
pandemic-response technologies is emblematic of the complicated
relationship between individuals and organizations who handle this
data. We argue that industry and government efforts to leverage
technology were doomed to fail because tech companies have failed
over the past twenty years to make their tools trustworthy and

GUNAWAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

5/14/2021 12:29 PM

THE TECHNOLOGY TRUST GAP

1507

lawmakers have done little to hold these companies accountable.
People cannot trust the interfaces they interact with, the devices they
use, and the systems that power tech companies’ services. Given this
historical context, why would people trust their technology to aid them
during a life-and-death public health crisis?
In this Essay, we explore the pre-existing ills that contributed to
these problems, including manipulative user interfaces, consent
regimes that burden people with all the risks of using technology, and
devices that collect far more data than they should. A pandemic
response is only as good as its adoption, but pre-existing privacy and
technology concerns make it difficult for people seeking lifelines to have
confidence in the technologies designed to protect them.
Our argument proceeds in three parts. First, in Part II, we outline
efforts to use technology to respond to the pandemic and why they were
fraught. As an example, we detail Google’s Project Baseline, which
aimed to help people identify COVID testing centers. We show how
questionable requests and broken promises undermined the
trustworthiness of the effort. We also describe concerns with other
technological interventions, such as proximity notification apps and
surveillance technologies. Next, in Part III, we explore one phenomenon
that hobbled our technological response to COVID—technology’s trust
gap. Simply put, when people cannot trust the layout of the screens they
interact with, the design of the devices they use, and the background
decision-making of the systems they expose themselves to, people are
not in a position to use these technologies in a public health crisis. We
explore concepts such as dark patterns, insecure Internet of Things
(IoT) devices, and algorithms that target the vulnerable and spread
public health misinformation. Collectively, these problems give people
little reason to feel safe using any digital technology, even if doing so
would improve their health prospects.
In Part IV, we propose a way for lawmakers and industry to earn
and ensure peoples’ trust. We argue that a good way to help close the
technology trust gap is through relational duties of loyalty and care,
better frameworks regulating the design of information technologies,
and substantive rules limiting data collection and use instead of
procedural “consent and control” regimes. We conclude that the
pandemic could provide an opportunity for motivated lawmakers to
improve our privacy frameworks and make information technologies
worthy of our trust.
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II. DISAPPOINTING TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE PANDEMIC
COVID required government and industry to act with
unprecedented speed and scale. Thankfully, our existing technological
infrastructure allows companies to implement solutions swiftly and
broadly. Unfortunately, companies could not break bad habits
developed from decades of information gluttony.1
Technology
presented users with questionable requests for additional information
and broken data security promises before the pandemic. When people
are desperate for a lifeline, they become ripe for exploitation when
governments and corporations make questionable requests for data or
misuse information they have collected. Even when companies set out
to create a privacy-friendly intervention, such as Apple and Google’s
respective efforts to leverage their phones for proximity notification
apps,2 they are continuing to draw water from a well that Silicon Valley
poisoned years ago. There are complex reasons why institutions had
trouble leveraging technologies to respond to the pandemic. Much of
this failure is intertwined with governmental shortcomings. But tech
companies’ questionable requests, broken promises, and technosolutionism are a significant part of this story.
A. Questionable Requests
Data is an asset, and these days, an incredibly valuable one.3 It
powers the data economy,4 which extracts user data and turns it into
insights that can help peddle advertisements and personalization
features in the world of digital commerce. To learn more about users,
tech companies at all levels of the online experience amass billions of

1 For a more detailed look at the pathologies of information capitalism, see
generally JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER (2020).
2 Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE, https://covid19.apple.com/contact
tracing (last visited Apr. 04, 2021); Exposure Notifications: Using Technology to Help
Public Health Authorities Fight COVID-19, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/covid19/
exposurenotifications/ (last visited Apr. 04, 2021).
3 ALBERT OPHER ET AL., THE RISE OF THE DATA ECONOMY: DRIVING VALUE THROUGH INTERNET
OF THINGS DATA MONETIZATION 16 (2016), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/4JRO
LDQ7.
4 Ludwig Siegele, A Deluge of Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST, (Feb.
20, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/20/a-deluge-ofdata-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy; Knowledge@Wharton, Data as Currency: What
Value Are You Getting for It?, WHARTON SCH. BUS. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://knowledge.
wharton.upenn.edu/article/barrett-data-as-currency.
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data points from which to mine these insights, but a question remains:
is all of that data absolutely necessary to collect?5
In the early days of the pandemic in the United States, Alphabet’s
life sciences arm, Verily, began a program called Project Baseline to help
people find COVID-19 testing centers and get screened before receiving
a test.6 The service was initially available in California but has since
expanded to include several states across the U.S.7 By October, however,
some California cities shuttered their partnerships with Project
Baseline, particularly due to the requirement that people seeking
COVID-19 screenings must prove their identity through a Google
Account or otherwise register for one—as well as account
authentication hurdles for vulnerable populations like the homeless.8
Project Baseline’s COVID-19 program eligibility requirements cite
that an individual must be eighteen years of age or older, able to get to
a test site, and willing to sign an authorization and consent form—but
do not mention the mandatory Google Account as part of the eligibility
criteria.9 While Project Baseline assures that data used by the COVID19 program is stored separately and not directly linked to an
individual’s Google Account,10 the fact remains that individuals must
accept the risk of surveillance or take on the burden of deleting the
Google Account after receiving a screening.
While Verily’s promises of data separation and limited use may be
well and good, it is concerning that people seeking tests in a matter of
life and death were required to consent to Google’s entire data
ecosystem to participate in public health safety guidelines. The
homepage for the COVID-19 program describes it as “an effort to expand
access to COVID-19 screening and testing,” which few would argue
against. Beyond this, Verily announced a partnership with Janssen
5

Walter Frick, Do Tech Companies Really Need All That User Data?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/09/do-tech-companies-really-need-all-thatuser-data.
6 Verily, In Collaboration With The California Governor’s Office, Federal, State, And
Local Public Health Authorities, Will Launch Pilot Intended To Expand Access To COVID19 Risk Screening And Testing For High Risk Individuals At Bay Area Locations, PROJECT
BASELINE (Mar. 15, 2020), https://blog.projectbaseline.com/2020/03/verily-incollaboration-with-california.html.
7 COVID-19 Testing Program, PROJECT BASELINE, https://www.projectbaseline.com/
covid-19 (last visited Apr. 04, 2021).
8 Jenny Gold & Pradhan Rachana, Verily’s COVID Testing Program Halted in San
Francisco and Oakland, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 26, 2020), https://khn.org/news/
verilys-covid-testing-program-halted-in-san-francisco-and-oakland; COVID-19 FAQ,
PROJECT BASELINE, https://www.projectbaseline.com/covid-support.
9 COVID-19 Testing Program, supra note 7.
10 COVID-19 FAQ, supra note 8.
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Research & Development to launch a new COVID-19-related study as
part of Project Baseline, using data from screening users to determine
eligible participants.11 This follows a previous study launched by Verily,
which began in May of 2020, to study immune responses to the virus.12
Verily stated that study participants needed to have previous COVID-19
test results, but that these tests did not have to be conducted by Verily.13
Considering that the original purpose of Project Baseline was to “make
it easier for people to participate in clinical research,”14 it is still unclear
why Google Accounts are the only acceptable form of authentication for
COVID-19 screening, when prerequisites to join the Verily studies do not
require Verily tests.
A Google account-or-nothing consent regime in such distressing
times is worrisome, even if COVID-19 data is kept separate from the
greater Google ecosystem. Promises that data will remain siloed are
hard to trust. In the early days of the pandemic, few other options for
getting tests existed, and individuals should not have had to consent to
tertiary services in their efforts to protect their health.
As many have pointed out, industry’s values do not always align
with the public interest, and this can create issues when trying to
fashion technology-driven solutions to public problems.15 It can be
difficult to disentangle tech companies’ benevolence in a pandemic with
their profit-driven goals.
B. Broken Promises
When technology changes faster than individuals can understand
and respond, people are put at a steep disadvantage when it comes to
protecting their privacy. System designs that do not seriously protect
privacy are vulnerable to mission creep and exploitation over time,
11 Frank Vinluan, Verily Joins with Janssen, Adding Covid-19 to Project Baseline Study,
MEDCITY NEWS (Feb. 9, 2021, 12:00 PM), https://medcitynews.com/2021/02/verilyjoins-with-janssen-adding-covid-19-to-project-baseline-study; Verily Partners with
Janssen to Launch COVID-19 Immune Response Study, VERILY LIFE SCI. (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://verily.com/stories/verily-partners-with-janssen-to-launch-covid-19-immuneresponse-study.
12 Elise Reuter, Alphabet’s Verily launches Covid-19 antibody study, MEDCITY NEWS,
(May 18, 2020), https://medcitynews.com/2020/05/alphabets-verily-launches-covid19-antibody-study.
13 Id.
14 New Baseline COVID-19 Research Project launches, VERILY LIFE SCIS. (May 18, 2020),
https://verily.com/stories/new-baseline-covid-19-research-project-launches.
15 See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Woodrow Hartzog, and Laura Moy, The Dangers of TechDriven Solutions to COVID-19, BROOKINGS INST. (June 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/techstream/the-dangers-of-tech-driven-solutions-to-covid-19. See generally
COHEN, supra note 1; FRANK PASQUALE, THE NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS (2020).
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whether through unprecedented data collection under promises of
“temporary” pandemic purposes or through data being repurposed
beyond its original goal. The whiplash of failed privacy promises leads
to greater doubt and distrust in technologies intended to protect public
health.
Singapore, one of the first countries to deploy contact tracing apps
to track the spread of COVID-19 among its population, is a good example
of how mission creep leads to broken promises and the erosion of trust.
The country initially struggled with the adoption of their voluntary
TraceTogether smartphone app.16 First released in March 2020, the app
was reportedly adopted by a mere 20% of the population by May,17
when the app became mandatory for migrant workers.18 To address the
needs of citizens who do not use or prefer not to use a mobile phone, the
Singaporean government provided physical proximity devices (called
the TraceTogether Token) and made these available to Singaporeans in
June.19
Both the app and the token use a custom protocol, BlueTrace, that
collects information from either a smartphone or the token whenever
devices with TraceTogether installed detect each other. This protocol
facilitates proximity tracing by keeping records of who has come into
proximate contact with one another. By November, nearly half of the
country’s residents had adopted the application20 and a digital check-in
system, SafeEntry,21 but by then it seemed that the government would
make the app or token mandatory for people visiting public facilities by

16 TRACETOGETHER, GOV’T OF SINGAPORE, https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg (last visited
Apr. 04, 2021); Sarah Kreps et al., Contact-tracing apps face serious adoption obstacles,
BROOKINGS INST. (May 20, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/contacttracing-apps-face-serious-adoption-obstacles.
17 Sarah Kreps et al., supra note 16.
18 Press Release, Singapore Ministry of Manpower, New Resources to Provide Better
Care for Migrant Workers (May 27, 2020), https://www.mom.gov.sg/newsroom/pressreleases/2020/0527-new-resources-to-provide-better-care-for-migrant-workers.
19 Press Release, Seniors to Receive First Batch of TraceTogether Tokens, Smart
Nation Singapore (Jun. 28, 2020), https://www.sgpc.gov.sg/sgpcmedia/media_
releases/sndgo/press_release/P-20200628-2/attachment/Media%20Release%20%20Seniors%20to%20receive%20first%20batch%20of%20TraceTogether%20Toke
ns%2028062020.pdf.
20 Bobbie Johnson, Some Prominent Exposure Apps are Slowly Rolling Back Freedoms,
MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/23/
1012491/contact-tracing-mandatory-singapore-covid-pandemic.
21 SAFEENTRY, https://safeentry.gov.sg (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
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December 2020.22 In mid-December, the target date for mandatory
TraceTogether check-in was pushed back to early 2021.23
Then, in early January 2021, the Singaporean government
announced that the police would be able to access data collected by the
TraceTogether/SafeEntry system for use in seven categories of criminal
offenses—contradicting claims the government made at launch that the
technologies would be used solely for contact tracing, right as nearly
80% of the country’s population had adopted the software.24 A minister
who previously touted the TraceTogether software as “purely for
contract tracing” revealed that contract tracing data had already been
used by the Singaporean police in a murder investigation.25
TraceTogether’s privacy policy was updated to reflect this revelation
after the minister’s announcement on January 4, 2021—almost a year
after the app’s initial release without this disclosure.26
Governments naturally want to commandeer powerful tools for
their own purposes. Google and Apple are creating a playbook for
governments on how our phones can be repurposed for all kinds of
surveillance. Even large and powerful companies are subject to political
pressure. Will tech companies that develop COVID information
technologies be able to resist indefinitely governments’ attempts to
change the design of these tools? The U.S. government vacated its order
to compel Apple into building a modified iOS that would allow them to
bypass encryption protections, but can we always count on this
backtracking?27 Apple reportedly dropped its plan to allow users to

22 Lester Wong, Use of TraceTogether App or Token Mandatory By End Dec., STRAITS
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/use-of-tracetogetherapp-or-token-mandatory-by-end-dec; Lester Wong, Singapore Cinemas to Begin Rolling
Out Compulsory TraceTogether-Only Entry From Oct. 26, STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.straitstimes.com/tech/singapore-cinemas-to-begin-rolling-outcompulsory-tracetogether-only-entry-from-oct-26.
23 Press Release, Moving Into Phase Three of Re-Opening, Ministry of Health of
Singapore (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.moh.gov.sg/news-highlights/details/movinginto-phase-three-of-re-opening.
24 Mia Sato, Singapore’s police now have access to contact tracing data, MIT TECH. REV.
(Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/05/1015734/singaporecontact-tracing-police-data-covid.
25 Amir Hussain, TraceTogether Data Used by Police in One Murder Case: Vivian
Balakrishnan, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 5, 2021), https://uk.news.yahoo.com/trace-togetherdata-used-by-police-in-one-murder-case-vivian-084954246.html.
26 TRACETOGETHER, supra note 16.
27 Romain Dillet, Justice Department Drops Lawsuit Against Apple as FBI has now
Unlocked Farook’s iPhone, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 28, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/
03/28/justice-department-drops-lawsuit-against-apple-over-iphone-unlocking-case.
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encrypt their backups in the cloud after the FBI complained.28 This dam
will not hold indefinitely.
A pandemic response clearly must escalate in proportion to the
intensity of a global health crisis.
Governments and private
organizations can and should do what is necessary to stop the spread
and protect human lives—but they should not overstep boundaries
under a blanket excuse of public health. Mission creep violates our
expectations of safety and privacy and makes us skeptical of
government actions that may be repurposed post-pandemic.
C. Techno-Solutionism
One of the most predictable and often misguided trends of the
smartphone era is tech companies and governments trying to solve
complex social problems with apps.29 “There’s an app for that” is not
just a marketing slogan30—it is an operating ethos for Silicon Valley. But
overreliance on apps and technical solutions is not just a question of
efficacy. It represents a massive opportunity cost, as it diverts valuable
political capital and dominates public discourse when other more
difficult, but more effective and sustainable, options are the wiser path.
One of the most high-profile technological pandemic interventions
was Google and Apple’s respective modifications of their phones’
operating systems to accommodate proximity notification apps.31 The
project modified the iOS and Android operating systems to allow
government health agencies to build apps that use a mobile phone’s
Bluetooth communication capabilities.32 These apps would enable a
person who tests positive for the coronavirus to send out an “exposure”
notification to other app users’ phones to alert them that their phones
had been in the vicinity of the infected person’s phone during a given
period. People getting this information could decide whether to selfisolate or get tested.
To protect privacy, the system only used Bluetooth, did not collect
location data, hid a user’s identity, required permission to collect
proximity data or upload data from the phones of people who test
28 Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Apple Dropped Plan for Encrypting Backups After FBI
Complained––Sources, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/usapple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backupsafter-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT.
29 See, e.g., EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE (2013).
30 Brian Chen, Apple Registers Trademark for ‘There’s an App for That’, WIRED (Sept.
10, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/10/app-for-that.
31 Steph Hannon, Exposure Notifications: End of Year Update, GOOGLE (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://blog.google/inside-google/covid-19/exposure-notifications-end-year-update.
32 See supra note 2.
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positive for COVID-19, and stored all data locally on a user’s phone
unless the user decided to notify others.33 Additionally, the companies
required users to enter a unique code provided by health authorities to
notify nearby users that they have been infected.34
Adoption of this contact tracing technology, both by governments
and citizens, varied widely. In the United States, efforts to roll out apps
with Exposure Notification features must be conducted at the state level,
with the app approved only in nineteen U.S. states as of December
2020.35 For some states, adoption levels among the population were
lower than 10% even after months of the apps’ availability.36 In other
regions, numbers are more promising37 but still fall short of ideal.
The public has good reason to view COVID apps with a critical eye.
First, tech platforms can only control so much. For example, Google and
Apple promised to serve as staunch gatekeepers of the system they
created by only allowing government health authorities to use the
Exposure Notification tracing capabilities.38 To protect civil liberties,
the companies said they would not allow other government agencies to
mandate use of the app (presumably by denying them system access).
That does not prevent other parties like employers and schools, who are
not bound by the platforms’ terms of use for app developers, from
requiring app participation as a condition of employment or entrance.
It is also unclear how well Apple and Google can police the app operators
to ensure that the apps comply with the rules. How can policymakers
help guarantee system-wide fidelity when it is so easy for things to fall
through the cracks?
But perhaps the biggest reason people are rightfully distrustful of
an app-based approach to complex social problems is the concept of
path dependency—the idea that norms, history, and technical and
organizational structure make diverting from a particular path difficult.
Once deployed, information tools, systems, and practices are unlikely to
be “rolled back.” Governments and tech platforms repeatedly touted
33 APPLE, INC. AND GOOGLE, EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2020),
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//covid19/exposur
enotifications/pdfs/Exposure-Notification-FAQ-v1.2.pdf.
34 WI Exposure Notification App Privacy Policy, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS. (Dec. 23,
2020), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/app-privacy.htm.
35 Asmae Fahmy, Google and Apple Join Forces to Bolster Contact Tracing, VERYWELL
HEALTH (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.verywellhealth.com/google-apple-exposurenotification-covid-5092947; Alejandro De La Garza, People are Finally Downloading
COVID-19 Exposure Notification Apps. Will They Make a Difference?, TIME (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://time.com/5921518/covid-exposure-notification-apps.
36 De La Garza, supra note 35.
37 Hannon, supra note 31.
38 EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 33.
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contact tracing apps and COVID-19-related surveillance as temporary
measures for use only until the pandemic passes. That is likely to be a
fantasy.
Surveillance inertia is remarkably difficult to resist. Norms get set,
and practices and tools become entrenched. And who can say when this
will wind down? We are still dealing with the supposedly temporary
surveillance authorized almost twenty years ago in the wake of 9/11.
Rollbacks are rare and highly unlikely because the tools we build today
create a path dependency that will shape our future data and
surveillance practices.
There are significant opportunity costs and switching costs for
such heavy investments in these contact tracing apps. This tech-first
approach was less effective than governments hoped. But industry and
government do not often have the resolve and humility to double back
and try a different approach. Plus, the time lost to proximity
notification, which governments could have used to coordinate better
tools for public health messaging and a more effective and equitable
public health rollout, is time we cannot get back.
Silicon Valley tries to make all tasks easier. Tech platforms see the
costs associated with searching, sharing, and sorting as things to be
eliminated. But in the wake of countless privacy lapses on social
platforms and an unending wave of data breaches, it is clear that making
tasks easier, even important ones, can have the potential to cause great
collateral harm. The public is coming around to this. Tech companies’
crisis of trust should come as no surprise to anyone.
III. A LACK OF TRUST IN TECHNOLOGIES
It turns out that Silicon Valley’s approach of “moving fast and
breaking things” does not inspire a lot of confidence. In this Part we will
explore how the concerns that plagued pandemic-response
technologies were present well before the virus began to spread. We
consider three specific untrustworthy contexts: individuals cannot trust
the content and interfaces before their eyes, they cannot trust the
devices and software they use to keep their data safe, and they cannot
trust that their data would not be abused or used against them.
Privacy and trust are intuitively connected. We disclose our secrets
only to trusted individuals in real life if we can help it and try to reveal
only public or benign information to new acquaintances. In technology,
information and computer security rely on myriad authentication
methods to verify whether parties in communication with one another,
be they computer or device or human, can be trusted to continue with
data transfer. In law, privacy takes many interpretations, but trust is
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one option that defines privacy within relational contexts—especially
for information relationships.39
When people cannot trust the tools they use, they will withdraw or
be hurt and misguided. Technology’s trust gap existed before the
pandemic and is likely to continue long after it. Until lawmakers ensure
that tech companies will respect peoples’ trust, the same problems will
exist when lawmakers and industry try to leverage information
technologies to respond to the next public health emergency. In this
Part, we expand upon the privacy problems we outlined in Part II. We
break our analysis down into three areas of user inter interaction: an
interface and information level, a device and security level, and a
systemic, organizational level.
A. Interfaces and Information
The internet has a legitimacy problem, even during a pandemic. As
people are encouraged to stay at home and socially distance, the
resultant uptick in internet use exacerbates existing problems with
interface design elements in software and apps as well as the alarming
rate of misinformation across social media.
‘Dark patterns,’ which are software interfaces crafted to trick users
into activities they did not otherwise intend to perform, plagued the
screens of people looking to their tools for help during the pandemic.40
Some dark patterns can lead to financial consequences, such as patterns
employed to get users to purchase additional services in online
39

See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 42–45 (2006); ARI EZRA WALDMAN,
PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 7 (2018); Jack M. Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1187
(2016); Jack Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 14 (2020);
Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 612
(2015); Lauren Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate, 46 J. CORP. L. 143 (2020); Ian Kerr, The Legal
Relationship Between Online Service Providers and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419, 446
(2001); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A
Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180, 1185 (2017); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Trusting
Big Data Research, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 579 (2017); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A
Relational Turn for Data Protection?, 4 EUROPEAN DATA PROT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2020); Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law (forthcoming 2021); Ari
Ezra Waldman, Privacy As Trust: Sharing Personal Information in A Networked World, 69
U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 560 (2015); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The
Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 193 (2016). But see Lina M. Khan & David E.
Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (2019).
40 Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design, A LIST APART
(Nov. 1, 2011), https://alistapart.com/article/dark-patterns-deception-vs-honesty-inui-design; Colin M. Gray, et al., The Dark (Patterns) Side of UX Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, 1, 1–14 (2018),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3173574.3174108.
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shopping contexts.41 Others may have privacy consequences, such as
“Bad Defaults,”42 which are default settings that are set to the options
that benefit user privacy least. Dark patterns are the dark underbelly of
persuasive technologies43 or nudges—designs that facilitate an
individual’s decision-making toward a specific outcome.44 Both dark
patterns, or “sludges,”45 and nudges exploit cognitive biases.46 The
difference lies in who benefits from the outcomes of an individual’s
nudged choices. Research on dark patterns spans several disciplines,
including behavioral economics, psychology, computer science, humancomputer interaction, and law.
All interface designs influence people one way or another. Choice
architecture cannot be avoided or “wish[ed] [] away.”47 People are
inundated with daily choices, and even more so when using digital
technologies—the number of choices is overwhelming.48 Choices must
be constrained within the services we use.49 When it comes to privacy,
however, individuals’ autonomy and control over their data must be
improved, rather than eroded, through the use of dark patterns.50

41 Arunesh Mathur, et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K
Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 1, 2 (2019) [hereinafter Dark
Patterns at a Scale]; Arunesh Mathur, et al., What Makes a Dark Pattern. . . Dark? Design
Attributes, Normative Considerations, and Measurement Methods, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2021 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1, 13 (forthcoming 2021)
[hereinafter What Makes a Dark Pattern. . .Dark?], http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.04843.
42 Christoph Bosch et al., Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark Strategies and
Privacy Dark Patterns, 2016(4) PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 237, 248 (2016); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox”, 31 CURRENT ISSUES
IN PSYCH. 105, 105, 107–09 (2020).
43 B. J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE THINK AND
DO 213 (1st ed. 2002).
44 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009).
45 Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCI. MAG. 431 (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6401/431; Stuart Mills, Nudge/Sludge
Symmetry: On the Relationship Between Nudge and Sludge and the Resulting Ontological,
Normative and Transparency Implications, BEHAVIOURAL PUB. POL. 1, 12 (2020); Olivia
Goldhill, Politicians Love Nudge Theory. But Beware its Doppelgänger “Sludge”, QUARTZ
(July 31, 2019), https://qz.com/1679102/sludge-takes-nudge-theory-to-newmanipulative-levels.
46 See generally Waldman, supra note 42, at 2; see also Dark Patterns at a Scale, supra
note 41; What Makes a Dark Pattern…Dark?, supra note 41.
47 Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. REGUL. 413, 449 (2015),
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol32/iss2/6.
48 Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUROPEAN DATA PROT. L.
REV. 423, 429 (2018).
49 Id. at 426.
50 See generally Bosch, et al., supra note 42.
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In a pandemic, people flock not only to government-recommended
applications or health-related applications like Project Baseline51 but
also to social software and platforms. Strict lockdown measures and
severe adjustments to quotidian living led to sharp increases in the
usership of several applications, many of which offered free or
discounted versions of their service at the beginning of the pandemic.52
The cognitive bias of framing, however, intensifies in severity during a
pandemic. Framing selectively chooses aspects of a given reality and
amplifies them, typically resulting in different interpretations of the
item being described.53 It adds different weight to an object and
influences how a person might perceive it, often to encourage certain
conclusions over others—for better or worse, depending on how the
framing is applied. When it comes to privacy, how an application frames
a feature will impact whether people consider it to be privacy-protective
or secure, regardless of how secure a feature truly is. Framing, then,
contains the potential to obfuscate problems regardless of intent,
sometimes in manipulative ways. In pandemic times, people are
juggling additional stressors, from health and safety to adjusted living
situations, and the available mental energy for carefully screening each
decision for potential manipulation is low in supply.
The urgency of a global health crisis changes the way people
perceive lifelines like contact tracing apps or other digital socialization
software. When apps offer free services under a banner of altruism or
helpfulness but fail to inform new, tentative users of the ad or thirdparty tracking software already built into their service, they exploit
individuals’ limited mental resources during an already difficult time.
Compounded with dark patterns, like requiring account creation or
providing credit card information for free trials, these ‘altruistic’ offers
only add to a person’s burdens.54 Some communication and remote
socialization apps exploded in popularity during the early months of the
pandemic, when people sought ways to interact under social distancing
guidelines. But one such app, HouseParty, was rife with dark patterns
that prodded users into providing the app with their contact lists,
51 PROJECT BASELINE, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=
com.google.android.apps.baselinestudy&hl=en_US.
52 Chance Miller, These Apps and Services are Responding to Coronavirus Pandemic
with Free Information, 9TO5MAC (Apr. 2, 2020), https://9to5mac.com/2020/04/02/
apps-and-services-coronavirus.
53 Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 J.
COMMC’N 51, 51–58 (1993).
54 Woodrow Hartzog et al., Beware of Apps Bearing Gifts in a Pandemic, BERKMAN
KLEIN CTR. COLLECTION (Aug. 18, 2020), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/
beware-of-apps-bearing-gifts-in-a-pandemic-490fabaade01.
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Facebook friend lists, and unnecessary smartphone permissions—and
HouseParty’s privacy policy indicates that individuals’ information may
be used by third parties, other vendors, and their parent organization.55
Positive framing manipulates users’ cognitive resources and glosses
over the negatives or existing problematic data collection policies of
such services.56
Governments have attempted to address dark patterns through
legislation, though such changes have yet to be enacted. The Deceptive
Experiences to Online Users Reduction (DETOUR) Act of 2019 aims to
prohibit deceptive user interfaces. The Act considers dark patterns as
interfaces with the effect of “obscuring, subverting, or impairing user
autonomy, design-making, or choice to obtain consent or user data.”57
The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 (CPRA) amended the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and explicitly mentions dark
patterns specific to consent regimes, stating that “agreement obtained
through use of dark patterns does not constitute consent.”58 Yet there
is no federal law that prohibits companies from leveraging peoples’
limited resources and abilities against them in an adversarial way that
benefits the company at the expense of the person.
Misinformation is also a scourge online. There is some reason to
believe that the copious amount of misinformation that social media
companies amplify is not as consistently effective at duping people as
some headlines might suggest.59 There is plenty of reason, however, to
be concerned about the fact that misinformation takes up so much real
estate in our information diets and headspace, crowding out important
truths and vital public health messaging. Giving people the choice to
pick which information is “true” leads to people choosing false
information as their guiding light or leads to people disengaging from
information altogether out of decision fatigue. In both cases, failing to
prevent the proliferation of false information amplifies the risk of
encountering bad outcomes. Additionally, there is evidence that
algorithmic filtering might facilitate or strengthen echo chambers
where people are connected to ideas that they are prone to agree with.60
55

HOUSEPARTY PRIVACY POLICY, https://houseparty.com/privacy-policy.
Waldman, supra note 42, at 106.
57 Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act, S. 1084, 116th Cong.
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1084/text.
58 CALIFORNIA PRIVACY RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2020 (CCPA), CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.100-1798.199 (2020).
59 See generally Miriam J. Metzger et al., From Dark to Light: The Many Shades of
Sharing Misinformation Online, 9 MEDIA AND COMMN’C 134, 134–43 (2021).
60 Uthsav Chitra & Christopher Musco, Analyzing the Impact of Filter Bubbles on
Social Network Polarization, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB
56
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Misinformation can negatively affect public health, racial justice,
democracy, and the strength of our commitment to public institutions.
During the pandemic, misinformation messaging is associated to public
health concerns like vaccine hesitancy and misperceptions of maskwearing efficacy,61 as well as racial rumormongering.62 Even if the
majority of netizens disbelieves online misinformation, the
consequences of misinformation accepted as truth by some individuals
risk lives and safety.
The interfaces and information passing before netizens’ eyes were
already untrustworthy before the pandemic. But the stakes were raised
when severe illness and risk of death were added to the list of potential
consequences of manipulative content.
B. Applications and Devices
Both smartphone apps and IoT devices can host security
vulnerabilities and privacy problems. Frequent discoveries of data
leaks and breaches make it difficult to trust the devices we use, and even
more difficult at a time when this trust is most crucial.63
While a ‘bulletproof’ app or smart device is a thing of fantasy, the
constant discovery of leaks and security issues in computer science
research leads to frayed trust in the promises made by application
markets or platforms like Android and iOS. Some apps exfiltrate audio,
videos, and screenshots from an individual’s device to third parties;64
some apps’ privacy risk varies from version to version.65 Sometimes the
SEARCH AND DATA MINING 115, 115–23 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1145/3336191.337
1825; John Kelly & Camille Francois, This Is What Filter Bubbles Actually Look Like, MIT
TECH. REV. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/08/22/140661/
this-is-what-filter-bubbles-actually-look-like; Zoe Schiffer, ‘Filter Bubble’ Author Eli
Pariser on why we need Publicly Owned Social Networks, VERGE (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/11/12/20959479/eli-pariser-civicsignals-filter-bubble-q-a.
61 Robert Hornik, Ava Kikut, Emma Jesch, Chioma Woko, Leean Siegel & Kwanho
Kim, Association of COVID-19 Misinformation with Face Mask Wearing and Social
Distancing in a Nationally Representative US Sample, HEALTH COMMUN. (Nov. 22, 2020),
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33225745.
62 Misinformation on Novel Coronavirus Impacting Asian American Businesses, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/misguided-virusfears-hitting-asian-american-businesses.
63 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & WOODROW HARTZOG, BREACHED! WHY DATA SECURITY FAILS AND
HOW TO IMPROVE IT (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).
64 Elleen Pan et al., Panoptispy: Characterizing Audio and Video Exfiltration from
Android Applications, 2018 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 33, 33–50 (2018).
65 Jingjing Ren et al., Bug Fixes, Improvements,…and Privacy Leaks––A Longitudinal
Study of PII Leaks Across Android App Versions, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 NETWORK AND
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS SECURITY SYMPOSIUM (2018), https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/ndss2018_05B-2_Ren_paper.pdf.
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same online service leaks different information in app form versus
desktop browser form.66
Problems with leaky devices make it difficult to trust IoT solutions
to the pandemic. Smart devices encompass a wide range of functionality
enabled by rich sensors like microphones, cameras, and thermostats,
and recent work finds that they not only exfiltrate potentially sensitive
data like private conversations67 but also send data to third parties and
exhibit behavior that allows eavesdroppers to infer user activity.68
Encryption, while necessary and useful, in some cases cannot hide the
types of device interactions that create network traffic, which may allow
an “eavesdropper to infer [the] devices in [a] consumer’s network and
how they are used.”69 Leaks aside, IoT data may be used against
consumers even when they are aware of the data collection; health
organizations like insurance providers have used smart toothbrushes
and in-car trackers to adjust customers’ rates.70 This information is not
comforting in the scope of COVID-19, when surveillance technologies
have been deployed to inspect individuals’ temperatures, movements,
and compliance with government orders.
In the rush to find better treatments and a cure, the medical field
can turn to technology for solutions. Some consider IoT a potentially
helpful tool in the arsenal against the virus,71 but discussions of IoT’s

66 Christophe Leung et al., Should You Use the App for That? Comparing the Privacy
Implications of App- and Web-Based Online Services, in IMC ‘16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 365, 365–72 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1145/2987
443.2987456.
67 Daniel J. Dubois et al., When Speakers Are All Ears: Characterizing Misactivations
of IoT Smart Speakers, 2020 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 255, 255–76 (2020).
68 Jingjing Ren et al, Information Exposure From Consumer IoT Devices: A
Multidimensional, Network-Informed Measurement Approach, in IMC ‘19: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 267, 267–79 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1145/
3355369.3355577; Said Jawad Saidi et al., A Haystack Full of Needles: Scalable Detection
of IoT Devices in the Wild, in IMC ‘20: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNET MEASUREMENT
CONFERENCE 87 (2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.01880.
69 Id.
70 Christina Farr, This Start-Up Made Connected Toothbrushes––Now it Aims to
Overthrow the ‘Primitive’ Dental Insurance Industry, CNBC (May 15, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/beam-dental-raises-22-million-from-kleiner-tochange-dental-insurance.html; Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Auto Trackers Not Worth
Car Insurance Discounts, Most Say, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 14, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2016/01/14/scenario-auto-insurancediscounts-and-monitoring; Tracy Vence, Why We Don’t Recommend Smart Toothbrushes,
N.Y. TIMES (2020), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/smart-toothbrushesdont-recommend.
71 Ravi Pratap Singh et al., Internet of Things (IoT) Applications to Fight Against
COVID-19 Pandemic, 14 DIABETES & METABOLIC SYNDROME: CLINICAL RSCH. & REVS. 521, 521–
24 (2020).
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merits in a pandemic response cannot take place without accounting for
the problems with IoT. Technologies proposed for battling COVID-19
include small tokens like TraceTogether’s but can also take more
alarming forms, like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)72 and thermal
facial recognition devices.73 Additional software has improved facial
recognition capabilities and accounts for mask-wearing,74 adding to a
slew of prior concerns over facial recognition.75 IoT’s virus-fighting
benefits cannot be uncoupled from serious ethical concerns, yet some
researchers scrambling for a solution have omitted the latter while
focusing only on the efficiency of such tools.76 While the severity of
COVID-19 calls for some forms of compromise, the additional risks of
strategies like using GPS data for exposure tracing or passive
temperature monitoring are still unknown and require stricter
scrutiny.77
Coupled with the unprecedented levels of data collection that IoT
and smartphone sensors are capable of (especially at a global pandemic
scale), it is difficult to view the benefits of such tracking technologies as
outweighing the risks.
C. Systems and Intentions
A third area of distrust is at an organizational, systemic level. Not
only is it difficult to trust the algorithms and technical systems
underlying the tools we use but it is additionally difficult to trust those
who produce these tools. A technology cannot be decoupled from the
organization that builds it when considering trust; a well-meaning
technology company may have biased algorithms, and even
hypothetically just, fair, and accountable technology may be deployed
by a company that means to sell it to information-greedy organizations.
Both the tool and the organization must be trustworthy for people to
feel comfortable sharing their data.

72 See generally V. Chamola et al., A Comprehensive Review of the COVID-19 Pandemic
and the Role of IoT, Drones, AI, Blockchain, and 5G in Managing its Impact, 8 IEEE ACCESS
90225 (2020).
73 Meredith Van Natta et al., The Rise and Regulation of Thermal Facial Recognition
Technology During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7 J.L. BIOSCIENCES (forthcoming 2021),
https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa038.
74 Face Recognition Software Shows Improvement in Recognizing Masked Faces, NAT’L
INST. STANDARDS AND TECH. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/
2020/12/face-recognition-software-shows-improvement-recognizing-masked-faces.
75 Antoaneta Roussi, Resisting the Rise of Facial Recognition, 587 NATURE 350, 350–
53 (2020).
76 Chamola et al., supra note 72.
77 Van Natta et al., supra note 73.
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Misinformation’s filter bubble theory, in which personalization
algorithms may isolate users into information ‘bubbles’ or echo
chambers,78 is concerning as-is, especially when considering the
radicalized that susceptible individuals are exposed to online. The
danger of filter bubbles, however, is not only in the content but also in
the logic that determines how people receive content. Algorithms
facilitate at-scale automation and improved efficiency when operating
with many users’ data, but they are not immune from severe flaws like
bias and discrimination either from faulty training sets or the algorithm
design itself. It is not only content delivery algorithms that are in
question, but advertising delivery ones as well—studies have found that
platform advertising algorithms may deliver ads that skew along race
and gender lines, even when the advertiser did not so intend.79 The
potential for discrimination through advertising is pervasive, even
when platforms provision rules and categories intended to protect
against it.80 Biased outcomes from ad delivery networks can arise
across both demographic81 and political lines,82 eroding trust in the
content placed before individuals and the platforms that service them.
For a pandemic-specific case, Facebook updated their advertising
policies specifically for COVID-19 in reaction83 to findings that their ad
delivery system approved and accepted highly dangerous, misinformed
advertisements, like those citing bleach as a cure for the virus.84 A
reactionary response is better than no response. Such advertisements
could have real damage even within short timeframes for

78 Eli Parisoer, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You, Penguin
(2011).
79 Ailsa Chang, How Facebook Wants to Handle Misinformation Around the
Coronavirus Epidemic, NPR (March 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/25/821
591134/how-facebook-wants-to-handle-misinformation-around-the-coronavirusepidemic; Kaveh Waddell, Facebook Approved Ads with Coronavirus Misinformation,
CONSUMER REPS. (April 27, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/social-media/
facebook-approved-ads-with-coronavirus-misinformation.
80 Giridhari Venkatadri & Alan Mislove, On the Potential for Discrimination via
Composition, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 ACM INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 333,
333–44 (2020), https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3419394.3423641.
81 Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad
Delivery Can Lead to Biased Outcomes, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 1–30
(2019); Venkatadri & Mislove, supra note 80.
82 Muhammad Ali et al., Ad Delivery Algorithms: The Hidden Arbiters of Political
Messaging (Mar. 2021), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
WEB SEARCH AND DATA MINING, https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3437963.3441801.
83 Information
on
Advertising
Policies
about
COVID-19,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1123969894625935, (last visited Feb. 11,
2021).
84 Waddell, supra note 79.
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exposure—and it is still difficult to be sure that all dangerous
advertisements are effectively filtered from the platform.
Trusting or mistrusting an algorithm, however, is different from
being able to trust the organization handling your data. Already
concerned about abuses of their data in technology they use, people are
especially worried when the incentives of the companies processing
their data are murky—or outright controversial. Kashmir Hill’s
groundbreaking piece on Clearview AI in January 202085 shocked the
world—how could laypeople have known that a secretive facial
recognition start-up was scraping the internet for their photographs, let
alone selling this data to law enforcement?86 The slew of reactions that
followed included cease-and-desists from the companies from whom
Clearview scraped public data,87 several class action lawsuits over
Clearview’s data collection,88 and considerable discourse over the
statutory immunity given to Internet service providers regarding
liability for hosting the content of third parties.89 Companies using
Clearview’s dataset were under fire as well, with class action lawsuits
filed against them for their patronage.90

85 Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearviewprivacy-facial-recognition.html.
86 Elizabeth Lopatto, Clearview AI CEO Says ‘Over 2,400 Police Agencies’ are Using its
Facial Recognition Software, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
8/26/21402978/clearview-ai-ceo-interview-2400-police-agencies-facial-recognition.
87 Clearview AI Responds to Cease-and-Desist Letters by Claiming First Amendment
Right to Publicly Available Data, HARV. J.L. & TECH., https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/
clearview-ai-responds-to-cease-and-desist-letters-by-claiming-first-amendment-rightto-publicly-available-data; Google, Youtube, Venmo and LinkedIn Send Cease-and-Desist
Letters to Facial Recognition App That Helps Law Enforcement, CBS NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020,
6:25 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-ceaseand-desist-letter-to-facial-recognition-app.
88 Amanda Bronstad, NY-Based Facial Recognition Tech Company Wrangles With
Judges in Two States Over Privacy Class Actions, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/09/10/ny-based-facial-recognitiontech-company-wrangles-with-judges-in-two-states-over-privacy-class-actions; Erin
Shaak, Clearview AI Hit with Class Action Lawsuit Over Controversial Data Collection
Practices, CLASS ACTION BLOG, https://www.classaction.org/blog/clearview-ai-hit-withclass-action-lawsuit-over-controversial-data-collection-practices.
89 Eric Goldman, Facial Recognition Database Vendor May Not Qualify for Section
230-Vermont v. Clearview, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2020), https://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2020/09/facial-recognition-database-vendor-may-not-qualifyfor-section-230-vermont-v-clearview.htm; Naomi Owen, #Privacy: Clearview Refers to
Section 230 in Vermont Lawsuit to Avoid Alleged Privacy Violations, PRIVSEC REPORT (June
4, 2020).
90 Sara Morrison, The World’s Scariest Facial Recognition Company is now Linked to
Everybody from ICE to Macy’s, VOX (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/
2/26/21154606/clearview-ai-data-breach; Macy’s Hit with BIPA Lawsuit for Using
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The scale of Clearview’s collection coupled with its law
enforcement partnerships and undetected operation serves as an
example of why we cannot easily trust industry actors and governments
with our sensitive data. In pandemic times, heightened intensity in the
types of data collected, where from, how much, and who uses this data
exacerbates these fears. In countries like China and Israel, pandemic
technologies were married to the government from the outset and
directly linked to existing surveillance technologies.91 In the previously
discussed Singapore example, the government stated that the dataset
was for COVID-19 purposes only, but revealed law enforcement uses
that reneged on original promises.92 Some increased monitoring is
necessary to track the spread of the coronavirus, but not all such
monitoring. Added surveillance measures like facial recognition with
thermal scans, telecom and cellular data used for location tracking, and
QR code check-in apps tied to real identification are dangerous pretexts
for “accelerating the mass collection of personal data to track citizens,”
and this mission creep93 makes us wary.94
The task of determining what level of data collection is appropriate
for such extraordinary times is extremely difficult. For a solution to
work, it must be widely adopted and provide governments with enough
information to stay ahead of the virus’ spread. If people cannot trust
that this information will not be over-collected or later abused,
necessary levels of adoption will be difficult to reach.

Clearview Biometric Surveillance, FINDBIOMETRICS, https://findbiometrics.com/macyshit-bipa-lawsuit-using-clearview-biometric-surveillance-080701.
91 Anat Ben-David, Israel is Following China on Surveillance. Here’s Why that Should
Worry You, HAARETZ (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/technews/.premium-israel-is-following-china-on-surveillance-that-should-worry-you1.9343225; Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler & Rachel Aridor Hershkowitz, How Israel’s COVID19 Mass Surveillance Operation Works, BROOKINGS INST. (July 6, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-surveillanceoperation-works; Lily Kuo, “The New Normal”: China’s Excessive Coronavirus Public
Monitoring Could be Here to Stay, GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2020), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/the-new-normal-chinas-excessive-coronaviruspublic-monitoring-could-be-here-to-stay.
92 Sato, supra note 24.
93 Daniel Ryan Koslosky & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Mission Creep in National Security
Law, 114 W. VA. L. REV. (2011); Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health
Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347 (2007).
94 Kuo, supra note 91.

GUNAWAN (DO NOT DELETE)

1526

5/14/2021 12:29 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1505

IV. CLOSING THE TRUST GAP
Even though information technologies are not worthy of our trust
now, lawmakers could change that fact before the next public health
emergency. To close the trust gap between the organizations that build
or leverage data-intensive technologies and the people that use them,
especially in global health emergencies, lawmakers and organizations
should move beyond individualistic “consent and control over”
approaches to privacy to include relationships of trust, radically
overhaul design frameworks for information technologies, and embrace
substantive rules instead of procedures that ignore power dynamics and
justify practices that might be fair to the individual, but result in net
harm to society. Relational models of privacy are more sensitive to the
power disparities between people and tech companies. Strengthened
design frameworks help provide structure to relational norms of loyalty
and care, and they give people evidence that a system or company is
worth trusting. Substantive rules draw hard lines in the sand to keep
people protected whenever improved norms or frameworks are still not
enough.
A. Relational Duties of Trust
The trust gap exists in part due to the breakneck speed of
development for privacy-violating technologies. Pandemic response
requires thorough and deep collaboration between the public and
private sectors, but when people cannot comfortably put aside their
worries regarding the technologies intended to help them, trust in
government and well-meaning private organizations wanes.
When adoption at-scale is not only desired but a matter of life and
death for many, all actors implementing technological solutions or
strategies should operate from a place of duty. A few options have been
proposed, from building off relational obligations of trust, with specific
obligations of loyalty, care, forthrightness, confidentiality, and more.95
95 See SOLOVE, supra note 39; WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST, supra note 39; Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries, supra note 39, at 186; https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346; Lindsey Barrett,
Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1057 (2019); Brennan-Marquez, supra note 39; Ariel Dobkin, Information
Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1
(2018); Kerr, supra note 39; Paul Ohm, Forthright Code, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 471 (2018);
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 39; Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s
Trust Gap, supra note 39, at 1188; Richards & Hartzog, Trusting Big Data Research, supra
note 39; Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics
of Online Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95 (2019); Scholz, supra
note 39; Waldman, Privacy As Trust, supra note 39; Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust,
supra note 39; Richard S. Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations
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The ideas outlined in these proposals argue that technology
organizations should be seen as agents or stewards to those who trust
them: their users. People are inherently vulnerable both to poor
outcomes from decisions tech companies intentionally make, and to
attacks on these companies’ security by external threats. This leaves
people vulnerable in their information relationships, and mandated
trust keeps these relationships afloat.96 For example, a properly
implemented duty of loyalty would prohibit companies from taking any
actions regarding their technologies’ design or from processing of users’
personal information that conflicted with their best interests, to the
extent of their exposure.97 This would prohibit dark patterns that
turned people’s limitations against themselves and algorithmic
decision-making that was opaque, wrongfully biased, and harmful, or
which deprived people of significant opportunities. Alleviating the
burden of this vulnerability from the end-user requires considerable
faith in the controlling organization—namely, that technology
companies and government organizations responsibly handle and
communicate the risks of data disclosure to people. Improving trust
improves the technologically-mediated relationship between people
and companies. During a pandemic, improving this relationship might
additionally improve the adoption of tools used to control the
coronavirus.
B. Consent, Liability, and Design Frameworks
When understandings of trust and loyalty mend information
relationships, new standards in design and consent regimes that reflect
changing norms should follow.
Frameworks facilitate these
relationships and help people feel safe with technologies that hold
themselves to these structures. Even when an individual information
relationship fails, industry standards can help keep people protected at
a systemic level and let the consumer control what information
relationships to cultivate.

of Loyalty and Care in the Digital Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH L.J. 75
(2019); Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 340 (2014);
Jack Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game
Today—and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS INST. (July 12, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-gametoday-and-how-to-change-the-game. But see Khan & Pozen, supra note 39.
96 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 39.
97 See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty, supra note 39.
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Digital consent regimes are ultimately broken and insufficient to
address the ways individuals interact with online technologies. When
people use a device or application, they subject themselves to the
provisions outlined in the technology’s Terms of Use, Terms and
Conditions, and privacy policies. These technologies enjoy carte
blanche when they shift the burden of liability onto the user, while
individuals are left to deal with the fallout of privacy violations and
other misuses of their data. Users need not read these terms to be
bound by them,98 as with the shrink-wrap licenses99 in the late 1900s.
Individuals should not, however, be expected to read these terms and
policies—not when the burden and cost of doing so are incredibly
high.100 When consent is provided in this fashion, people are
unwittingly trapped into contracts they do not truly understand. In
pandemic times, consent can feel more coercive,101 as with Project
Baseline’s Google Account requirement102—it can feel like the choices
are between making an account and getting a test, on which one’s life
may depend. This can hardly be called an “agreement,” nor can it stand
up to new standards of consent, like those desired by regulations like
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).103
To fix broken consent regimes, we can consider ideal
circumstances for providing consent and create frameworks that guide
organizations as they handle consent statements and registration flows.
Beyond the requirements outlined in privacy laws like the GDPR,104
meaningful consent requests should be infrequent, with easily
envisioned risks, and the reasons for consenting should be accompanied
by incentives for data subjects to seriously examine the request.105
Consider the trust relationship in vaccinations, which provides an
example of what an ideal consent regime might include. People do not
frequently receive vaccines: this satisfies the first precondition. The
next two preconditions allow people to conduct an effective risk-benefit
analysis. Before vaccination, people are provided with relevant

98 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1116 (2017).
99 NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 36 (2013); Mark A.
Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 467 (2006);.
100 See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. POL. INFO. SOC. 543 (2019).
101 Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1461, 1461–1503.
102 COVID-19 Testing Program, supra note 7.
103 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 6.
104 See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
105 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 101.
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information as to potential side effects and the risks of forgoing
vaccination. For COVID-19, the risk of going unvaccinated may include
severe and life-threatening complications, while the benefits include
virus prevention and improved safety for people in contact with a
vaccinated person.106 The risk is vivid and easily imagined; the benefits
provide a real incentive for a person consenting to vaccination.
This framework for understanding consent is applicable to data
collection. People are inundated with fallible consent requests
everywhere, in pop-ups,107 app permission requests, websites’ cookie
banners,108 account registration, and myriad other ‘agreements’ that
may not provide people with real avenues for providing consent. These
requests are not infrequent—too many consent requests will begin to
lose meaning and can be annoying and deceptive.109 The risk of
consenting to these notices is not vivid or clear—the risks are hidden in
time-consuming legal documents. Fixing these consent regimes to be
more empowering, meaningful, and transparent for users is necessary
for restoring trust and for giving control over data back to the people
who provide it. How this would occur is beyond the scope of this Essay,
but we imagine stronger guidance around when to provide notice and
how as well as formal design structures that delegate more control to
the end-user.
Privacy-forward design frameworks must accompany improved
consent solutions. Problems with consent are exacerbated when
interface tricks are employed to obfuscate the contents of a technology’s
terms. Research into why designs like dark patterns are so
problematic110 and suggestions for improved privacy interfaces111 help
106 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COVID-19 AND YOUR HEALTH,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/vaccine-benefits.html (last
updated Jan. 5, 2021, last visited Feb. 14, 2021)
107 Midas Nouwens et al., Dark Patterns After the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and
Demonstrating Their Influence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 CHI CONFERENCE HUMAN FACTORS
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1, 1–13 (2020), http://doi.org/10.1145/3313831.3376321.
108 Célestin Matte et al., Do Cookie Banners Respect my Choice?: Measuring Legal
Compliance of Banners from IAB Europe’s Transparency and Consent Framework, in 2020
IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY (SP) 791, 791–809 (2020).
109 Most Cookie Banners are Annoying and Deceptive. This is not Consent., PRIVACY INT’L
(2019), http://privacyinternational.org/explainer/2975/most-cookie-banners-areannoying-and-deceptive-not-consent.
110 See generally Dark Patterns at a Scale, supra note 41; What Makes a Dark
Pattern…Dark?, supra note 41.
111 See generally LORRIE FAITH CRANOR ET AL., CYLAB SEC. AND PRIV. INST., DESIGN AND
EVALUATION OF A USABLE ICON AND TAGLINE TO SIGNAL AN OPT-OUT OF THE SALE OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BY CCPA, (2020); Patrick Gage Kelley et al., A “Nutrition Label”
for Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1, 1–12
(2009), http://doi.org/10.1145/1572532.1572538.
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articulate why design-level regulation is so imperative. While the
DETOUR Act would require that online operators frequently present
disclosures on data use and that these disclosures not be “deceptively
obscured,”112 robust design standards that clarify when an interface
element becomes “dark” could provide better guidance for user
experience designers. While there are various aspects of the DETOUR
Act that might create implementation problems, the bill outlines the
need for a professional standards body that would help define
acceptable conduct and build design frameworks driven by ethics and
value sensitivity.113
In addition to bolstering privacy design frameworks, we should
work to improve Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)-based
protections (normative guidance for information practices),114 which
often fail in practice.115 Efforts to improve privacy by design that rely
on expounding the importance of FIPPs should also seek to amend the
FIPPs themselves, expanding them from vague principles to actionable
guidance for practitioners. GDPR’s guidance on “data protection by
design and default”116 is an excellent start, but effective approaches like
the GDPR’s should strive to provide stricter, more specific parameters
regarding what design choices to make.
C. Substantive Rules Limiting Data Collection and Use
Changes in information relationship norms and interface design
can be incredibly powerful for protecting a user’s individual welfare, but
substantive legal rules can help prevent privacy problems when the
previous two recommendations fail to be enough. Consent regimes are
practically unscalable, overly individualistic, and function to justify all
manner of harmful actions so long as companies that control people’s
medium of expression can extract a perfunctory acquiescence.117 What
is needed are un-waivable rules, beyond flexible purposes stated by
companies and governments themselves, that limit when companies
112 Deceptive Experiences to Online Users Reduction Act, S. 1084, 116th Cong.
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1084/text.
113 Id.
114 MARTHA K. LANDESBERG ET AL., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at 71 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf.
115 Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 343, 343 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/12/ftc-20180098-d-0036-163372.pdf.
116 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 45.
117 Richards & Hartzog, supra note 101; Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33 (2020);.
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and governments can collect information, what kinds of information
they can collect, how they can use it, and with whom they can share it.
Concerns over law enforcement’s use of COVID-19 tracing data are
well-founded, as indicated by Singapore’s case. One way to prevent
further violations of privacy at the hands of the government is to
disallow law enforcement use of tracking data from the outset, whether
that be pandemic-specific datasets or privately collected datasets like
Clearview’s facial database. Australia’s pandemic response provides an
example of trust-building through substantive rules, particularly
regarding their COVIDSafe contact tracing app,118 released in April 2020.
At launch, the app was accompanied by an emergency Determination
under Australia’s Biosecurity Act of 2015 that would allow the
collection, use, and disclosure of COVIDSafe data for prosecuting
citizens for offenses under the Act.119 Researchers quickly responded
with concerns over potential law enforcement use of the COVIDSafe
data, describing the COVIDSafe provisions as “an experiment in
surveillance and trust,” and pointed out flaws in the Determination as
well as other issues with data use and minimization.120 This
Determination was quickly repealed on May 15, 2020, with the Privacy
Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Act 2020.121 The
Privacy Amendment Act not only disallowed law enforcement use of
COVIDSafe data but also created new offenses for using this dataset for
purposes other than contact tracing. The government addressed other
concerns regarding the technical security of the application or in-thebackground data collection by making the source code for both Android
and iOS versions of COVIDSafe publicly available on Github.122 Updates
to the source code are pushed to Github and are available for review by
the technical community.
Australia’s rapid and preemptive measures to alleviate fears of
data abuse reflect desired traits for a pandemic response: as transparent
as possible, swiftly deployed, and carefully articulated. These traits are
also necessary for any technical solutions for the pandemic, especially
118 COVIDSafe App, AUSTRALIAN GOV. DEP’T OF HEALTH (2020), https://www.health.gov.
au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app.
119 Biosecurity (Human Biosecurity Emergency) (Human Coronavirus with
Pandemic Potential) (Emergency Requirements—Public Health Contact Information)
Determination 2020, pt. 2 paras 6–9 (Austl.) (no longer in force).
120 Graham Greenleaf & Katharine Kemp, Australia’s ‘COVIDSafe App’: An Experiment
in Surveillance, Trust and Law 2 (April 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available
as part of the University of New South Wales Law Research Series, 2021),
http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2021/7.html.
121 Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Act, sch. 1 div. 2 s 94D
(Austl.).
122 COVIDSafe, GITHUB, https://github.com/AU-COVIDSafe.
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where risk of surveillance is high. Conversely, Singapore’s delayed
responses to privacy concerns and later exposure of law enforcement
uses of TraceTogether data provide an example of retroactive measures.
To keep citizens’ data protected and retain their trust, substantive rules
and prohibitions must be outlined well in advance. To maintain trust
and inspire it, these substantive rules should be accompanied by
auditing and enforcement; such rules will only be useful if they are
followed.
Beyond the pandemic, industry and governments will continue to
find future uses for large-scale data collection and analysis. To prepare
for these developments, governments should preemptively outline
explicit limits for the protection of individuals’ data. One path forward
that may help build substantive lines in the sand for data collection is to
use frameworks for understanding data disclosure by weighing the
data’s utility against an individual’s disclosure risk.123
V. CONCLUSION
Before the pandemic, we were living with technologies that
disrespected or mishandled our privacy, our choices, and our online
safety. These problems led to a trust gap between individuals,
technology companies, and governments—a trust gap that has only
widened as a reaction to concerning COVID-19 practices like contact
tracing and mission creep.
While the world races toward a solution to the pandemic, privacy
and digital health must not become afterthoughts or sacrificial lambs.
The trust gap must be closed, not only to improve adoption of pandemicresponse technologies but also to protect people well after the threat of
the virus subsides. Adopting relational duties of loyalty and care can
help allay some of these concerns, especially when combined with
structured design frameworks that improve or outright eliminate
consent regimes and reduce interface trickery. These adjustments are
potential starts toward mending the broken trust between people and
data organizations—but they are not enough. Substantive rules
prohibiting misuse of data, particularly COVID-19 data, are necessary to
protect individuals’ privacy rights and prevent future invasions of
privacy from occurring.

123 GEORGE T. DUNCAN ET AL., Disclosure Risk vs. Data Utility: The R-U Confidentiality
Map, NAT’L INST. STAT. SCIS., at 31 (2001).
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The urgency of the pandemic must not be used as an excuse to
deprioritize user privacy or undermine trust—it must be seen as an
opportunity to rebuild confidence and create better digital experiences
that outlast the global health crisis.

